* c  {^: r-u^Ti^^-^  ^ 


U.S.  DEPO»tTOftY 

INTERSTATE  COMMERCE  COMMISSION 


REPORT  OF  THE  CHIEF  INSPECTOR  OF  SAFETY  APPLIANCES 
COVERING  THE  INVESTIGATION  OF  AN  ACCIDENT  WHICH 
OCCURRED  ON  THE  NEW  YORK,  NEW  HAVEN  &  HARTFORD 
RAILROAD  NEAR  WESTERLY,  R.  I.,  ON  OCTOBER  25,  1913. 

April  24,  1914. 
To  the  Commission: 

On  October  25,  1913,  there  was  a  derailment  of  a  passenger  train 
on  the  New  York,  New  Haven  &  Hartford  Railroad  near  Westerly, 
R.  I.,  which  resulted  in  the  injury  of  74  passengers  and  3  em- 
ployees. Investigation  of  this  accident  was  had  in  conjunction  with 
the  Public  Utilities  Commission  of  the  State  of  Connecticut,  and  a 
public  hearing  was  held  at  Providence,  R.  I.,  on  October  31,  1913. 
As  a  result  of  the  investigation  of  this  accident  I  beg  to  submit  the 
following  report : 

The  derailed  train  was  eastbound  train  No.  26,  en  route  from  New 
York,  N.  Y.,  to  Boston,  Mass.  It  consisted  of  three  Pullman  cars, 
all  equipped  with  steel  underframes,  one  smoking  car,  and  two 
coaches,  all  of  wooden  construction,  hauled  by  locomotive  No.  1309. 
The  train  was  in  charge  of  Conductor  Taber  and  Engineman  Smith. 
Train  No.  26  left  Westerly  at  9.25  p.  m.,  14  minutes  late,  and  at 
about  9.30  p.  m.  was  derailed  at  a  point  1.6  miles  east  of  Westerly 
while  running  at  a  speed  estimated  to  have  been  between  30  and  35 
miles  per  hour.  Neither  the  engine  nor  the  tender  were  derailed. 
With  the  exception  of  one  wheel  on  the  north  rail,  all  of  the  wheels 
under  the  first  Pullman  car  were  derailed,  while  all  the  other  cars  in 
the  train  were  derailed  and  came  to  rest  on  the  south  side  of  the  track, 
some  of  them  extending  partly  over  the  embankment. 

The  train  broke  in  two  between  the  second  and  third  cars,  the 
four  rear  cars  being  separated  from  the  forward  portion  of  the  train 
a  distance  of  about  150  feet.  Illustration  No.  1  is  a  view  looking  in 
a  westerly  direction,  and  shows  the  position  of  the  last  four  cars 
after  the  derailment. 

This  part  of  the  New  York,  New  Haven  &  Hartford  Railroad  is  a 
double-track  line,  and  trains  are  operated  under  the  controlled- 
manual  block-signal  system.  Approaching  the  point  of  derailment 
from  the  west  there  are  about  2,000  feet  of  tangent,  all  on  a  descend- 
ing grade  of  about  one-half  of  1  per  cent.  The  track  is  laid  with 
100-pound  steel  rails,  33  feet  in  length,  single  spiked  to  18  or  19 


2  INTERSTATE    COMMERCE    COMMISSION. 

untreated  chestnut,  oak,  and  pine  ties,  no  tie-plates  being  used  on 
straight  track.  At  the  point  of  derailment  the  track  is  on  a  12-foot 
fill,  chiefly  composed  of  gravel.    The  ballast  is  of  gravel  varying  from 


12  to  16  inches  in  depth.     Examination  showed  this  track  to  be  in 
good  condition.     It  was  raining  at  the  time  of  the  derailment. 

Examination  of  the  equipment  of  the  derailed  train  showed  nothing 
which  in  any  way  could  have  contributed  to  the  derailment.  Exami- 
nation  of  the  track  showed  that  the  first  indication  of  anything:  wrong 


ACCIDENT   NEAR   WESTERLY,   R.  I.,   ON   OCTOBER  25,   1913.  3 

was  a  broken. rail  on  the  south  side  of  the  track.  West  of  this  broken 
rail  there  were  no  marks  of  any  kind  upon  the  rails  or  ties,  while 
east  of  the  same  the  ties  had  been  cut  and  broken  by  derailed  wheels, 
the  track  being  torn  up  for  a  distance  of  about  600  feet.  East  of  the 
initial  point  of  derailment  the  north  rail  was  torn  out  of  alignment 
for  a  distance  of  about  12  rail  lengths,  while  12  successive  rails  on 
the  south  side  were  also  torn  up.  Four  of  these  rails  on  the  south 
side  were  separated  from  each  other,  the  bolts  at  the  rail  joints  having 
been  sheared  off. 

The  crew  of  an  eastbound  passenger  train  which  passed  over  this 
traek  less  than  an  hour  previous  to  the  derailment  testified  that 
they  felt  no  unevenness  in  the  track,  and  that  they  did  not  notice 
anything  which  would  indicate  that  there  was  anything  wrong  with 
it.  Engineman  Smith,  of  train  No.  26,  stated  that  the  first  thing  he 
noticed  was  a  slight  jar  or  yank.  He  at  once  applied  the  air  brakes, 
and  on  looking  back  saw  fire  flying  from  underneath  the  cars.  After 
the  accident  no  defects  or  damage  of  any  kind  were  found  to  exist 
with  respect  to  the  locomotive,  and  he  operated  it  through  to  Boston. 
Fireman  Murphy  testified  that  at  the  time  of  the  derailment  he  was 
putting  coal  on  the  fire.  He  did  not  notice  any  jar  from  the  driving 
wheels,  being  of  the  opinion  that  it  came  from  behind  the  engine. 
The  testimony  of  the  other  members  of  the  crew  shed  no  light  as 
to  the  cause  of  the  accident,  their  first  intimation  that  there  was 
anything  wrong  being  the  shock  occasioned  by  the  cars  being  derailed, 
coupled  with  the  application  of  the  air  brakes. 

This  accident  was  caused  by  a  broken  rail.  The  investigation  to 
determine  the  reason  for  the  failure  of  this  rail  was  conducted  b> 
Mr.  James  E.  Howard,  engineer  physicist,  whose  report  immediately 
follows : 

REPORT    OF    ENGINEER   PHYSICIST. 

The  broken  rail  which  caused  the  derailment  of  train  No.  26  was 
a  C  rail,  100  pounds  section,  open-hearth  steel,  of  the  New  York. 
New  Haven  &  Hartford  Railroad's  design,  manufactured  by  the 
Bethlehem  Steel  Co.,  April,  1910.  heat  J-1391.  It  was  laid  in  the 
track  June  5,  1910,  and  therefore  had  been  in  service  for  a  period 
of  three  years  and  four  months  at  the  time  of  derailment. 

The  rail  had  the  following  dimensions : 

Height 6  inches. 

Width  of  head . ' 2f  inches. 

Width  of  base 5$  inches. 

Thickness  of  web finch. 

Length 33  feet. 

Moment  of  inertia 47. IS 


INTERSTATE    COMMERCE    COMMISSION. 


The  specifications  for  chemical  composition  governing  its  manu- 
facture and  the  composition  reported  as  having  been  furnished  were : 


Chemical  con- 
stituents. 


Called  for  by 
the  specifi- 
cations. 


Carbon 0.70  to  0.83 

Manganese 60  to   .90 

Silicon i      .20 

Phosphorus .04 

Sulphur I 


Said  to  have 

been 
furnished. 


0.80 
.76 
.183 
.033 
.046 


The  specifications  called  for  a  drop  test  in  which  a  2,000-pound 
tup  should  be  dropped  from  a  height  of  15  feet,  the  rail  resting  upon 
supports  3  feet  apart.  It  was  required  that  the  rail  should  deflect  not 
more  than  1.45  inches  on  the  first  blow,  nor  upon  fracture  display- 
less  than  6  per  cent  elongation  in  1  inch,  or  5  per  cent  in  2  consecu- 
tive inches.  The  drop  test  made  on  this  heat  of  steel  was  reported 
as  having  shown  a  deflection  of  0.9  inch. 

This  rail  showed  very  little  wear  as  the  result  of  its  service  in  the 
track.  The  head  retained  its  shape,  and  externally  the  appearance  of 
the  rail  was  good. 

It  fractured  in  three  places  at  the  time  of  derailment,  at  distances 
of  1  foot  10  inches,  4  feet  10  inches,  and  6  feet  7  inches,  respec- 
tively, from  the  leaving  end.  At  the  first  and  third  of  these  places 
transverse  fissures  were  disclosed  measuring  in  diameter  about  H 
inches  each.  The  initial  line  of  fracture  was  probably  that  which 
occurred  6  feet  7  inches  from  the  leaving  end.  The  intermediate 
fracture,  believed  to  have  been  a  secondary  one,  did  not  have  a  trans- 
verse fissure. 

Photograph,  figure  No.  2,  shows  the  relative  positions  of  these  lines 
of  fracture  as  they  were  viewed  from  the  gauge  side  of  the  rail. 
The  movement  of  the  train  on  the  rail  was  from  right  to  left,  Line 
of  rupture  CC  was  the  first  to  occur,  it  is  thought. 

The  train  left  the  track  southerly  through  the  opening  made  by 
the  three  fragments  shown  on  figure  No.  2  and  the  opening  made  by 
succeeding  rails  east  of  this  point.  To  the  west  of  the  line  of  rupture 
CC  the  track  remained  intact. 

Subsequent  to  the  derailment  an  additional  fracture  was  made 
when  removing  the  rail  from  the  track,  at  a  place  about  5^  feet  west 
of  line  of  rupture  CC.  At  this  place  a  transverse  fissure  1|  inches  in 
diameter  was  displayed.  The  rail  was  then  shipped  to  Providence, 
where  two  more  transverse  fissures  were  disclosed  upon  raising  one 
end  of  the  rail  and  allowing  it  to  fall  upon  a  concrete  walk  from  a 
height  of  about  6  feet.  These  fissures  measured  If  inches  and  five- 
eighths  inch  in  diameter,  respectively. 


ACCIDENT   NEAR  WESTERLY,   R.   I.,   ON   OCTOBER  25,   1913. 


In  all,  five  transverse 
fissures  were  displayed 
in  the  rail,  each  of 
which  was  located  on 
the  gauge  side  of  the 
head.  In  resume  these 
fissures  were  located  at 
the  following  distances 
from  the  leaving  end  of 
the  rail :  1  foot  10  inches, 
6  feet  7  inches,  12  feet 
1  inch,  17  feet  8  inches, 
and  21  feet. 

A  second  rail,  from  the 
same  heat  as  the  above, 
was  removed  from  the 
track  and  its  structural 
condition  examined. 
This  rail,  branded 
"Bethlehem  Open 
Hearth  100B  IIII  10/' 
was  taken  from  the  track 
adjacent  to  or  near  the 
broken  rail.  Both  were 
laid  at  the  same  time, 
and  each  was  exposed  to 
the  same  conditions  of 
service. 

These  rails  were  tested 
in  part  at  the  Bureau  of 
Standards,  while  con- 
tributory work  was  done 
at  the  Washington  Navy 
Yard  and  bjr  the  New 
Haven  Railroad  at  its 
New  Haven  laboratory 
and  at  the  works  of  the 
Bethlehem  Steel  Co- 
followed  by  a  metallo- 
graphic  examination  by 
Mr.  Wirt  Tassin. 

The  report  of  the  Bu- 
reau of  Standards  upon 
the    chemical    composi- 


9^JP/I?U0JJ_ 


CA 


W£>/p  ?//    '9JD99/J 


^ 


INTERSTATE    COMMERCE    COMMISSION. 


tion  of  the  steel,  slag  determination,  metallographic  examination,  and 
tensile  tests  follows: 

REPORT  OF  THE  BUREAU  OF  STANDARDS. 

CHEMICAL   ANALYSIS. 

In  Table  I  are  shown  the  results  of  chemical  analysis  of  rails  1 
and  2  taken  at  three  places. 


Table  I. 

Location. 

Car- 
bon. 

Sul- 
phur. 

Phos- 
phorus. 

Man- 
ganese. 

Sili- 
con. 

Nickel. 

Oxides 
and 
slag. 

Chro- 
mium. 

Rail  1: 

Near  running  surface  of  head 

Junction  of  web  and  head 

Flange  of  base 

0.83 
.82 
.84 

.8.3 
.85 
.84 

0.039 
.040 
.043 

.040 
.041 
.039 

0.063 
.061 
.063 

.058 
.060 
.059 

0.78 
.79 
.79 

.79 

.79 
.80 

0.166 
.164 
.166 

.157 
.147 
.152 

0.081 
.049 
.069 

.29 
.27 
.29 

/    0.11 
\      .23 
I       .14 
\      .26 
/       -17 
\       .19 

.07 
.04 
.07 

0.05 
.05 
.04 

.05 

Rail  2: 

Near  running  surface  of  head 

Junction  of  web  and  head 

.02 
.03 
.02 

It  will  be  noted  that  the  two  rails,  barring  slag,  are  practically  of 
identical  composition. 

The  agreement  between  the  three  positions  in  each  rail  is  also  good, 
except  with  respect  to  nickel  and  slag  in  No.  1,  showing  no  apprecia- 
ble segregation,  if  any,  of  the  chemical  constituents.  The  difference 
as  to  nickel  may  be  due  to  errors  of  analysis  where  such  small  amounts 
are  concerned,  and  are  probably  without  significance. 

Attention  should  be  called  to  the  values  reported  for  slag  and 
the  question  of  slag  and  oxide  analysis  in  general.  The  methods 
used  for  both  are  very  unsatisfactory,  in  that  we  have  no  real  knowl- 
edge that  they  are  reliable,  but  a  good  deal  of  reason  to  believe  that 
they  fail  to  tell  us  what  they  purport  to  tell.  That  is  to  say,  in  the 
ase  of  slag  we  do  not  know  if  all  slag  is  obtained  by  the  method 
used,  i.  e.,  insolubility  in  iodine,  or  how  much  of  what  may  be  re- 
ported as  slag  is  such.  For  instance,  in  the  present  case,  the  silica 
percentage  in  the  slag  found  in  No.  1  does  not  exceed  20  per  cent, 
by  actual  test  of  several  samples.  This  means  less  than  50  per  cent 
of  silicate  slag,  if  all  the  silica  comes  from  that ;  but  if  any  iron  sili- 
cide  is  included  in  the  silica  found,  the  slag  percentage  should  be 
lowered  by  an  indeterminate  amount. 

Again,  this  slag  (ignited)  carries  about  9.8  per  cent  P2Os, 
which  we  may  suppose  to  have  belonged  to  iron  phosphide.  If  so, 
and  if  the  composition  of  the  phosphide  is  Fe3P,  and  if  again  this 
became  converted  during  ignition  to  Fe2Os  and  P205,  we  must  deduct 
the  oxygen  corresponding  to  this  change,  which  in  the  present  in- 
stance would  be  14.5  per  cent. 


ACCIDENT  NEAR  WESTERLY,  R.  I.,  ON  OCTOBER  25,  1913.  7 

Still  again,  the  slag  contained  a  little  chromium  in  unknown  con- 
dition. Allowing  for  the  maximum  amount  of  real  (silicate)  slag 
permissible  as  deduced  from  the  silica  percentage  and  of  iron  silicide 
and  phosphide,  there  remains  a  large  probable  deficiency,  which  may 
perhaps  be  made  up  by  oxide  of  iron  or  some  oxide  other  than  one  of 
manganese,  which  element  is  not  present  in  the  slag  from  either  rail 
(calcium  is  also  absent).  If  the  slag  carried  carbide  and  silicide 
of  iron,  the  iron  and  silicon  of  these  would  be  left  after  ignition  as 
Fe^C^  and  SiO.,.  The  variations  in  slag  noted  for  rail  1  may  be  due 
to  actual  local  variations  in  slag  content  or  perhaps  in  part  to  uncer- 
tain analysis. 

It  is  probable  that  the  slag  analyses  are  comparable  for  the  two 
rails,  since  these  are  otherwise  of  very  exactly  the  same  composition. 
It  is  of  interest  to  note  that  the  rail  No.  1  which  failed  in  service  had 
three  or  four  times  as  much  slag  as  the  other  rail  from  the  same 
heat  in  the  same  track,  suggesting  a  greater  inherent  weakness  refer- 

le  to  this  cause. 

METALLOGRAPHIC    EXAMINATION. 

A  section  of  rail  No.  1  was  cut  5  inches  back  of  break,  12  feet  from 
receiving  end,  polished  and  etched  electrolytically  by  being  made  the 
anode  in  a  bath  of  ammonium  chloride.  By  this  treatment  the  areas 
of  segregation  are  shown  by  dark  spots  and  streaks.  Figure  No.  3 
shows  the  appearance  of  the  section  after  this  treatment.  The  web 
sIioavs  a  considerable  amount  of  segregation,  but  the  metal  of  head 
and  base  is  not  seriously  affected.  A  section  of  rail  No.  2  treated  in 
the  same  way  shows  a  structure  nearly  identical  with  that  of  rail  No. 
1,  as  shown  on  the  same  figure.  The  amount  of  segregation  shown  by 
these  two  sections  may  be  regarded  as  typical  and  appears  to  bear 
no  intimate  relation  to  the  formation  of  the  transverse  fissures  found 
in  rail  No.  1. 

Sections  for  microscopic  examination  were  taken  from  head,  web 
and  base  of  each  of  the  two  rails.  The  metal  in  the  head  was  ex- 
amined both  from  the  gauge  side  and  opposite  portion.  Except  for 
an  increase  of  grain  size  in  the  head  and  occasional  slag  threads,  the 
structure  is  very  uniform  throughout.  As  near  as  can  be  judged,  the 
microstructure  of  the  two  rails  is  identical.  The  metal  consists  of  an 
intimate  mixture  of  pearlite  crystals,  i.  e.,  saturated  or  eutectoid  steel. 
The  method  of  etching  used,  2  per  cent  nitric  acid  in  alcohol,  darkens 
the  pearlite ;  the  lighter  appearance  of  many  of  the  crystals  is  due  to 
the  different  reflection  of  the  light  caused  by  the  orientation  of  the 
crystals. 

In  the  interstices  between  many  of  the  crystals  are  areas  of  very 
coarse  pearlite.  Such  areas  are  numerous  and  are  found  scattered 
uniformly  throughout  the  whole  mass.  In  these  areas  the  two  con- 
stituents of  pearlite  (ferrite  or  pure  iron  and  cementite  or  carbide  of 


8 


INTERSTATE    COMMERCE    COMMISSION. 


iron)  are  in  particles  of  sufficient  size  (i.  e.,  plates)  that  the  weaken- 
ing effect  upon  the  metal  as  a  whole  must  be  appreciable. 

These  areas  can  not  be  well  represented  in  a  photomicrograph  of  100 
diameters  magnification.     They  appear  as  small  light-colored  grains. 

After  annealing,  these  interstitial  pearlite  areas  are  more  pro- 
nounced and  distinct. 


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End  views  A  and  B  in  figure  No.  4  show  the  typical  appearance  of 
the  transverse  fissures  abundant  in  the  head  of  rail  No.  1.  No  fis- 
sures were  found  other  than  on  gauge  side  of  the  rail.  The  metal  im- 
mediately adjacent  to  such  fissures  was  examined  in  detail.     Sections 


ACCIDENT   NEAR  WESTERLY,  R.  I.,  ON  OCTOBER  25,  1913. 


41897—14 2 


10  INTERSTATE    COMMERCE    COMMISSION. 

were  taken  perpendicular  to  the  face  of  the  fissure  and  the  metal  im- 
mediately back  of  the  break  examined.  It  was  not  found  to  differ 
materially  in  structure  or  constituents  from  that  of  the  rail  as  a 
whole.  Photomicrographs  C  and  D  show  the  structure  of  the  metal 
just  back  of  fissures  at  breaks  12  feet  and  15  feet  4  inches,  respectively, 
from  the  receiving  end  of  the  rail.  It  consists  of  the  same  mixture  of 
pearlite  crystals  as  is  found  throughout  the  body  of  the  rail.  There 
appears  to  be  no  unusual  segregation  of  slag  or  foreign  inclusions 
to  be  found  here. 

Specimens  were  taken  from  each  of  the  two  rails  after  annealing 
a  section  of  the  head  of  each.  The  occurrence  and  distribution  of  in- 
terstitial areas  of  coarsely  laminated  pearlite  are  here  more  evident. 
Both  rails  show  considerable  free  cementite,  which  has  coalesced  as 
boundaries  of  the  grains  as  a  result  of  the  annealing  process.  Cement- 
ite is  the  carbide  of  iron,  F3C,  and  is  the  hard,  brittle  constituent 
of  high-carbon  steels  (annealed)  and  cast  irons.  It  occurs  here,  not 
uniformly  distributed  throughout,  but  is  more  or  less  segregated.  A 
sample  was  taken  from  rail  No.  1  after  annealing  just  back  of  the 
face  of  one  of  the  transverse  fissures.  The  specimen  shows  consid- 
erable quantities  of  free  cementite.  The  estimated  carbon  content  of 
such  spots  is  over  1  per  cent.  The  amount  of  cementite  found  in 
specimens  from  rail  No.  1  was  considerably  more  than  in  the  samples 
from  rail  No.  2.  This,  however,  may  be  only  fortuitous.  Before  an- 
nealing, such  free  cementite  can  not  be  detected  with  certainty  be- 
cause it  exists  as  isolated  particles  which,  during  annealing,  coalesce 
to  form  the  grain  boundaries  and  also  because  the  metal  contains  in- 
clusions of  various  natures  which,  under  the  conditions,  can  not  be  dif- 
ferentiated from  the  cementite  particles  with  certainty. 

The  chemical  analysis  indicates  a  carbon  Content  of  (0.82)  or  very 
slightly  different  from  the  eutectoid  composition  (0.85).  The  occur- 
rence of  so  much  free  cementite  may  be  attributed  to  the  restraining 
action  of  the  manganese  content.  The  carbon  is  retained  in  the  con- 
dition normally  characteristic  of  a  steel  of  higher  carbon  content. 
Such  steel  will  have  properties  approximating  those  of  the  steel  whose 
true  carbon  content  is  equal  to  the  apparent  content  of  the  steel  under 
discussion. 

Tensile  samples  which  had  been  cut  from  rail  No.  2  were  submitted 
after  having  received  the  heat  treatment  stated  in  the  tabulation  of 
the  tensile  tests.  The  structure,  so  far  as  can  be  distinguished  under 
the  microscope,  is  the  same  in  all.  They  are  all  in  the  indefinite  stage, 
sorbite,  preceding  the  revolution  into  pearlite,  which  takes  place  in 
the  critical  range.  The  tempering  temperatures  were  not  chosen  at 
wide  enough  intervals  to  show  any  decided  structural  change. 

The  critical  or  recalescence  point  of  this  steel  was  determined  to  be 
about  1250°  F.  The  very  coarse-grained  structure  of  the  rail  is  due 
to  rolling  at  a  temperature  very  much  higher  than  the  critical  range. 


ACCIDENT  NEAR  WESTERLY,  R.  I.,  ON  OCTOBER  25,  1913. 


11 


The  weakening  effect  of  slag  associated  with  coarse  structure  would 
have  been  lessened  by  rolling  and  finishing  at  lower  temperatures. 


'«/«-- s^p""" 


WKtKmS^  ; 


1  •  ipsa 

.    .       •.'•i.V' 


C  D 

No.  5. — A.  View  of  one  of  the  coarse  interstitial  pearlite  areas,  rail  No.  1;  magnification  250  diame- 
ters; etched  with  2  per  cent  nitric  acid.  Such  areas  are  very  numerous  throughout  the  body  of  the 
rail  and  must  exert  an  appreciable  weakening  effect  upon  the  whole. 

B.  Section  from  head  of  rail  No.  1,  after  annealing;  magnification  250  diameters;  etching,  hot  sodium 
picrate.  In  the  unannealed  specimens  the  free  cementite  does  not  occur  in  the  form  of  definite  cell 
boundaries.  These  are  caused  by  the  coalescing  of  smaller  particles  during  the  annnealing  process. 
The  indefinite  dark  circular  spots  are  the  cut  ends  of  the  slag  threads  and  not  free  cementite. 

C  Photomicrograph  from  the  base  of  rail  No.  1,  section  parallel  to  the  rolling;  magnification  100 
diameters;  etching,  2  per  cent  alcohol  solution  of  nitric  acid.  The  structure  is  a  jumbled  mass  of 
pearlite  crystals.  The  long  dark  streaks  are  slag  threads.  There  are  coarse  interstitial  pearlite  areas. 
(The  photomicrographs  of  the  head  and  web  showed  similar  structure,  i 

D.  Photomicrograph  of  tensile  specimen  from  head  of  rail  No.  2,  after  heat  treatment,  quenched  in 
oil  from  temperature  of  1,400°  F.  and  drawn  at  1,250°  F.    Magnification  250  diameters. 

All  five  heat-treated  specimens  have  sorbitic  structure. 


SUMMARY. 


1.  No  unusual  segregation  of  impurities  is  found. 

2.  The  structure  throughout  the  section  of  the  rail  is  very  uniform. 


12 


INTERSTATE    COMMERCE    COMMISSION. 


3.  The  metal  immediately,  adjacent  to  the  "  transverse  fissures  " 
appears  to  be  of  the  same  nature  as  throughout  the  rest  of  the  rail. 

4.  No  unusual  segregation  of  impurities  or  "  slag  "  can  be  associated 
with  the  transverse  fissures ;  "  slag  streaks,"  however,  are  present  here 
in  the  usual  numbers  as  are  found  throughout  the  rest  of  the  head. 

5.  The  occurrence  of  the  interstitial  areas  of  very  coarse  pearlite 
must  have  an  appreciable  weakening  effect  upon  the  metal  as  a  whole. 

6.  The  occurrence  of  free  cementite,  which  in  itself  is  a  weak,  brittle 
constituent,  is  a  serious  defect  and  may  have  a  direct  bearing  on  the 
formation  of  the  "'transverse  fissures  "  developed  in  rails  of  such  com- 
position. 

Tensile  tests. 


SPECIMENS   FROM   RAIL    NO.  1. 


Description. 

Diameter. 

Sectional 
area. 

Elastic 
limit. 

Tensile 
strength. 

Elonga- 
tion. 

Contrac- 
tion of 
area. 

Remarks. 

Inches. 
1.129 

1.129 

1.129 
.505 

.505 

.505 
.505 
.505 
.505 
.505 
.505 

Sq.  in. 
1.00 

1.00 

1.00 
.20 

.20 

.20 
.20 
.20 
.20 
.20 
.20 

Pounds 
per  sq.  in. 

Pounds 

persq.in. 

60, 000 

78, 600 

77, 300 
135,500 

91,000 

145, 800 
145,500 
146,300 
148, 700 
146,000 
142, 000 

Per  cent. 
(') 

(') 

(') 
4.5 

(') 

11.0 
12.0 
10.0 
11.0 
11.0 
10.0 

Per  cent. 
(') 

(') 

W 

4.5 

C1) 

17.0 
17.0 
9.0 
15.0 
15.0 
14.5 

ture. 
Head  of  rail,  outside  half  from 
west  end. 
Do 

60,000 

55,000 
60,000 

65,000 

65,000 
65,000 

65,000 
65, 000 
65,000 
65,000 

Do. 
Do. 

Head  of  rail,  from  west  end, 

near  center  of  head. 
Head  of  rail,  from  west  end, 

outside  of  head. 
Web  of  rail,  from  west  end  — 
Do 

Do. 

Do. 

Do. 
Do. 

Base  of  rail,  from  west  end 

Do 

Do. 

Do. 

Do 

Do. 

Do 

Do. 

1  Inappreciable. 
SPECIMENS   FROM   RAIL   NO.  2. 


1. 129 

1.00 

49, 800 

9.0 

t1) 
12.5 

.505 

.20 

65,000 

144, 400 

Do. 

.505 
.505 
.505 
.505 
.505 
1.128 

.20 
.20 
.20 
.20 
.20 
1.00 

65, 000 
70, 000 
65,000 
70,000 
70, 000 
60, 000 

77, 500 
140, 800 
147,000 
149, 000 
150,400 

66, 300 

1.0 
3.0 
10.5 
11.0 
10.0 
0) 

.5 
3.5 
13.5 
15.5 
15.0 
0) 

Do. 

Do. 

Do. 

Do. 

Do 

Do. 

Head  of  rail,  middle  of,  an- 

(2) 

nealed. 

Head  forged  down  and  an- 
nealed. 

1.129 

1.00 

95,400 

1.6 

0) 

(3) 

Head  forged  down  to  1-inch 

diameter,      annealed,      re- 

heated  to    1,400°   F.,   and 

quenched  in  oil,  then  drawn 

as  described: 

Drawn  at  1,000°  F 

.505 

.20 

105,000 

150, 800 

15.5 

37.5 

Silkv. 

1,080°  F 

.505 

.20 

90,000 

148,000 

17.0 

42.0 

Do. 

1,150°  F 

.505 

.20 

95,000 

148,900 

17.0 

41.0 

Do. 

1,200°  F 

.505 

.20 

95,000 

150, 850 

18.0 

38.0 

Do. 

1,250°  F 

.505 

.20 

100,000 

144, 000 

16.0 

37.0 

Do. 

1  Inappreciable.    -  Oranular  blue-black  spot  §  by  \  inch.    :i  Granular;  broke  in  head  at  root  of  thread. 


ACCIDENT   NEAR  WESTERLY,  R.   I.,   ON   OCTOBER  25,  1913.  13 

DROP  TESTS  AT  THE  WORKS  OF  THE  MARYLAND  STEEL  CO. 

Drop  tests  were  made  at  the  works  of  the  Maryland  Steel  Co.  on 
one  piece  of  rail  No.  1  and  two  pieces  of  rail  No.  2.  Prior  to  these 
tests  the  second  rail  was  broken  in  several  places  by  bending  loads 
applied  in  the  testing  machine  at  the  Bureau  of  Standards,  but  none 
of  the  fractured  surfaces  showed  transverse  fissures.  The  drop  tests 
were  made  with  the  rail  sections  head  up,  supports  3  feet  apart,  2,000 
pounds  tup,  height  of  fall  15  feet.  The  rails  were  tested  at  a  tem- 
perature of  90  degrees. 

Rail  No.  1  sustained  the  first  blow  without  rupture,  showing  a  de- 
flection of  0.84  inch.  It  broke  on  the  second  blow,  with  an  extension 
of  the  metal  of  G  per  cent.  The  sections  from  the  second  rail  each 
broke  on  the  first  blow,  neither  developing  appreciable  extension. 
The  appearance  of  these  pieces  is  shown  by  figure  No.  6.  The  upper 
rail  in  the  cut  represents  No.  1.  The  middle  and  lower  sections  were 
those  from  rail  No.  2. 

It  will  be  noted  that  rail  No.  1,  which  failed  in  the  track  and  caused 
the  derailment  of  train  No.  26,  successfully  passed  the  prescribed  drop 
test,  displaying  an  extension  of  6  per  cent  as  required,  while  the  sec- 
ond rail,  which  failed  to  meet  the  drop  test,  did  not  fail  in  the  track. 

The  fracture  near  the  bolt  holes  of  one  section  of  rail  No.  2,  was 
secondary,  occurring  when  this  fragment  struck  the  bed  of  the  drop 
testing  machine  succeeding  the  blow  of  the  tup. 

The  section  of  rail  No.  2,  represented  by  the  lower  figure  of  the  cut, 
did  not  fracture  under  the  place  directly  struck  by  the  tup,  but 
sheared  out  a  fragment  22  inches  long,  symmetrical  with  the  supports. 

In  prescribing  only  6  per  cent  extension  of  the  metal  under  the 
drop  test,  as  an  index  of  the  ultimate  ductility  of  the  steel,  it  may  be 
said  that  such  extension,  developed  as  it  is  under  transverse  stress,  is 
not  far  above  the  zero  limit  of  ductility.  In  the  milder  grades  of 
steel  the  extension  under  transverse  stresses  commonly  exceeds  many 
times  that  witnessed  in  the  tensile  tests  of  the  metal.  In  these  two 
rails  the  reverse  was  true.  The  2-inch  tensile  specimens  from  the 
bases  of  these  rails  showed  10  and  11  per  cent  extension,  which,  equated 
for  specimens  of  greater  length  of  uniform  section,  would  still  be 
more  than  the  extension  in  the  drop  test  of  rail  No.  1,  which  was 
6  per  cent,  while  No.  2  failed  with  zero  extension. 

The  mechanical  work  required  to  rupture  steels  of  high  elastic  limit 
but  incapable  of  permanent  set  is  small  compared  with  the  work  re- 
quired to  rupture  mild  steels  which  display  the  extension  usual  in 
structural  steels.  If  the  indications  of  the  present  tests  are  confirmed 
and  it  is  found  that  rails  normally  of  limited  extension  tend  to  fail 
under  the  effect  of  rapidly  applied  loads  without   appreciable  set, 


14 


INTERSTATE    COMMERCE    COMMISSION. 


ACCIDENT   NEAR  WESTERLY,   R.  I.,   ON  OCTOBER  25,   1913.  15 

this  feature  in  the  use  of  hard  steels  will  demand  early  considera- 
tion, in  which  striking  velocities  and  temperatures  of  the  rail  should 
be  included. 

The  striking  velocity  of  the  tup  with  15  feet  height  of  drop,  as 
prescribed  in  current  specifications,  is  a  low  velocity  compared  with 
ordinary  train  speeds. 

TESTS  BY  THE  NEW  YORK,  NEW  II.W  i:\   d  HARTFORD  h'  ULROAD  CO. 

The  New  York,  New  Haven  &  Hartford  Railroad  Co.  conducted  an 
examination,  which  comprised  tensile  tests,  chemical  analyses,  metal- 
lographic  examination,  and  drop  teste,  the  later  at  the  works  of  the 
Bethlehem  Steel  Co.,  other  parts  at  its  New  Haven  laboraory.  In 
addition  to  supplying  data  confirming  the  information  from  other 
sources,  this  examination  resulted  in  showing  the  presence  of  a  con- 
siderable number  of  incipient  fissures  in  the  head  of  rail  No.  1,  at 
places  where  the  ordinary  manifestations  of  transverse  fissures  were 
not  in  evidence.  That  is,  the  fissures  had  not  reached  the  advanced 
stage  in  which  they  would  ordinarily  be  detected  by  visual  inspection. 
Deep  etching,  with  nitric  and  hydrochloric  acids,  developed  short 
transverse  cracks  or  incipient  fissures  which  were  thus  rendered 
plainly  visible  to  the  eye.  They  ranged  in  length  from  a  few  hun- 
dredths of  an  inch  to  three-eighths  inch.  So  far  as  could  be  judged 
the  zone  of  greatest  structural  disturbance  was  in  the  head  over  the 
gauge  side  of  the  web  and  toward  the  gauge  side.  The  etching  being 
very  deep  not  unlikely  brought  into  view  fissures  which  originally 
were  less  easily  discerned. 

A  group  of  these  incipient  fissures  is  shown  in  figure  No.  7,  (a)  and 
(b).  The  fissures  are  here  shown  about  natural  size,  the  same  group 
appearing  in  both  (a)  and  (b).  In  the  latter  they  are  partially  ob- 
literated by  rough  polishing  the  surface  while  removing  some  longi- 
tudinal scratches  and  introducing  others.  The  location  of  the  zone  in 
which  these  fissures  were  found  leads  to  the  inference  that  we  are  here 
examining  the  same  class  of  phenomenon  witnessed  in  the  larger 
transverse  fissures,  which  ultimately  result  in  the  complete  fracture 
of  the  rail.  If  such  is  the  case,  structurally,  a  more  general  disinte- 
grating effect  has  been  brought  about  than  indicated  by  the  display  of 
transverse  fissures  in  the  rail — that  is,  influences  which  tend  toward 
the  formation  of  transverse  fissures  are  not  localized  at  those  places 
only  where  fissures  have  reached  an  advanced  stage  of  development. 


16 


INTERSTATE    COMMERCE    COMMISSION. 


03    „ 


t  6 


.9  5 


2  * 
<g  .9 

•S  -S 


^  a 

■a  £ 
•2.S 
S3  3 
|l 

w     M 


® 


- 


>    ft  *i 

5      ft    W 

2  gl 

§ «  g 

,&S  E 
u  5  ft 
ago 

>-<  ^  a) 
[     »    i- 


ACCIDENT  NEAE  WESTERLY,  E.  I.,  ON  OCTOBEE  25,  1913.  17 

Other  rails  were  taken  from  service  by  the  New  York,  New  Haven 
&  Hartford  Railroad  Co.,  and  used  in  this  examination.  One,  an  E 
rail,  designated  as  No.  10,  was  taken  from  the  track  under  the  sup- 
position that  it  belonged  to  the  same  heat  of  steel  as  No.  1,  which 
caused  the  derailment.  Analysis,  however,  showed  that  it  came  from 
another  heat.  Check  analysis  at  the  steel  works  showed  the  follow- 
ing composition : 

Carbon,  O.S3.     Manganese,  0.49.     Phosphorus,  0.020.     Sulphur,  0.052. 

This  rail  did  not  break,  as  others  had,  when  lifted  with  a  magnet 
and  dropped  bodily  from  a  height  of  9^  feet.  When  ruptured  under 
the  regular  drop  test,  head  up,  three  breaks  were  made,  each  of 
which  were  reported  as  having  shown  clean  metal,  free  from  trans- 
verse fissures.  A  test  of  the  metal  from  the  gauge  side  of  the  head 
showed  a  tensile  strength  of  122,000  pounds  per  square  inch,  with  a 
contraction  of  area  of  20  per  cent. 

The  Bethlehem  Steel  Co.  in  reporting  upon  the  examination  of  the 
material  pertaining  to  this  inquiry  state: 

As  in  all  other  cases  of  rails  developing  transverse  fissures  in  the  head,  no 
segregation  of  any  kind  was  found  in  the  rails  to  account  for  this  defect.  There 
was  no  difference  found  between  the  inicrostructure  of  the  core  of  the  fissures, 
the  bright  parts  of  the  fissure,  or  any  other  part  of  the  rail.  All  fissures 
occurred  on  the  gauge  side  of  the  head  of  the  rails. 

A  rail  rolled  in  the  same  year  and  month  and  branded  the  same 
as  rail  No.  1,  but  which  had  not  been  used  in  the  track,  was  taken 
from  a  spare  rail  post  and  cut  up  for  examination.  The  chemical 
composition  of  this  rail  was  found  to  be : 

Carbon,  0.84.     Manganese,  0.87.     Phosphorus,  0.037.     Sulphur,  0.025. 

A  tensile  specimen  of  1  square  inch  sectional  area  and  10  inches 
long,  taken  from  the  center  of  the  head,  gave  the  following  results : 

Elastic  limit,  60,000  pounds  per  square  inch. 
Tensile  strength.  148,000  pounds  per  square  inch. 
Elongation,  6.3  per  cent. 
Contraction  of  area,  6.9  per  cent. 
Appearance  of  fracture,  granular. 


Sections  of  several  rails  included  in  this  inquiry  were  cut  out  for 
photographic  purposes,  metallographic  examination  and  check  de- 
termination of  the  carbon  at  the  Washington  Navy  Yard.  Metallo- 
graphic examination  was  made  by  Mr.  Wirt  Tassin,  with  the  assist- 
ance of  Mr.  Paul  E.  McKinney. 


18 


INTERSTATE    COMMERCE    COMMISSION. 


REPORT  OF  METALLOGRAPHIC  EXAMINATION  BY  MR.  WIRT  TASSIN. 

The  material  examined  included  two  specimens  identified  as 
"  Westerly  Kail  No.  1,  which  failed  in  the  track,"  with  five  specimens 
identified  as  "  Rail  No.  10,  which  had  been  in  service,  but  did  not  fail 
in  the  track." 

All  work  done  was  metallographic. 

WESTERLY  KAIL  NO.    1,   WHICH  FAILED  IN  THE  TRACK. 

Figures  8a,  8b,  and  8c  show  macroscopic  transverse  fissures  in  the 
rail  head,  as  seen  at  a  magnification  of  8,  on  a  specimen  taken  from 
the  "  west  end  "  of  the  rail.  They  are  plainly  visible  to  the  unaided 
eye  and  are  not  associated  with  slag,  sulphide,  or  oxide  areas,  nor 
are  they  accompanied  by  segregations  of  any  kind. 


Sb  Sc 

No.  8. — Macroscopic  transverse  fissures  in  the  head  of  rail  No.  1,  near  its  west  end.  Magnifi- 
cation 8  diameters.  Fissures  are  not  associated  with  slag,  sulphide,  or  oxide  areas,  nor 
accompanied  by  segregations  of  any  kind. 


ACCIDENT   NEAR  WESTERLY,   R.   I.,   ON   OCTOBER  25,  1913. 


19 


Figure  9a,  at  a  magnification  of  315,  using  a  B.  and  L.  8  mm. 
objective  and  a  15x  eyepiece,  shows  a  transverse  microscopic  fissure 
as  seen  on  a  longitudinal  section  cut  from  the  "  east  end  "  of  the 
rail  and  located  at  about  the  upper  center  of  the  head.  The  fissure 
could  be  readily  traced  for  a  distance  of  1  mm.,  0. 1574s  inch. 

Figure  9b,  at  a  similar  magnification,  is  another  transverse  fissure 
whose  length  could  be  traced  for  11  mm.,  0.43807  inch. 

Figure  9c,  at  a  magnification  of  315,  shows  a  typical  area  of 
incipient  fissures. 


r  ■.% 


9b 
No.  9.  Microscopic  transverse  fissures  from  head  of  rail  No.  1,  near  its  east  end;  magnification  313 

diameters. 
9a  was  traced  for  a  length  of  0.157  inch. 
9b  for  a  length  of  0.433  inch. 
9c  shows  a  typical  area  of  incipient  fissures.    These  fissures  are  not  associated  with  and  have  no  rela- 

tionlto  any  areas  of  sulphide,  slag,  or  other  inclusions. 


20 


INTERSTATE    COMMERCE    COMMISSION. 


In  each  instance  it  will  be  noted  that  these  fissures  are  not  asso- 
ciated with  and  have  no  relation  to  any  areas  of  sulphide,  slag,  and 
other  inclusions.  This  is  further  shown  in  figures  10a,  10b,  and  10c, 
which  are  at  the  same  magnification  and  show  seams  of  such  inclu- 
sions with  a  complete  freedom  from  microscopic  or  incipient  fissures. 

The  general  structure  of  the  rail  is  sorbitic.  There  is  little  or 
no  lamellar  pearlite,  no  free  cementite  or  ferrite.  The  sulphide,  slag, 
and  oxide  areas  are  small  and  sparingly  distributed.  There  are  no 
segregations. 


.    -: 


10b 


10c 


No.  10.  Showing  slag  and  sulphide  seams  in  head  of  rail  No.  1.    Magnification  315  diameters.    At  these 
seams  there  was  complete  freedom  from  microscopic  or  incipient  fissures. 


ACCIDENT  NEAR  WESTERLY,  R.  I.,  ON  OCTOBER  25,  1913.  21 

RAIL   NO.    10,    WHICH    HAD    BEEN    IN    SERVICE    BUT   DID    NOT   FAIL   IN    THE    TRACK. 

Figure  11  is  a  sketch  showing  the  location  in  the  rail  of  the  sections 
•xainined. 


{jduge  5/c/e 


<Sect/on—4— 
/rrepv/ar  ot/f//hes  /no'/cafe  f~/s sured 'Areas 


No.  11.— Cross  section  of  rail  No.  10,  showing  manner  of  cutting  up  for  examination,  and  location  of 

fissured  areas  found  therein. 


22 


INTERSTATE    COMMERCE    COMMISSION. 


Figure  12a,  magnification  315,  shows  incipient  transverse  fissures 
in  the  center  of  the  head  of  section  A. 

Figure  12b,  magnification  and  real  field  as  in  figure  12a,  is  from 
the  lower  center  of  the  head  of  section  A  and  shows  incipient  fissures. 


12b      . 

No.  12.  Incipient  fissures  found  in  the  head  of  rail  No.  10. 

12a  represents  fissures  found  in  the  center  of  the  head,  in  section  of  rail  marked  "  A. 

12b,  fissures  found  in  the  lower  center  of  the  head.    Magnification,  315  diameters. 


ACCIDENT  NEAR  WESTERLY,  R.  I.,  ON  OCTOBER  25,  1913. 


23 


Figures  13a  and  13b.  magnification  315,  show  the  small ness  of  the 
seams  of  slag  and  sulphide  as  found  in  section  A. 


13b 

No.  13.  From  head  of  rail  No.  10,  section  marked  "A,"  showing  the  smallness  of  the  seams  of  slag  and 
sulphide.    Magnification,  315  diameters. 


24 


INTERSTATE    COMMERCE    COMMISSION. 


Figures  14a,  14b,  and  14c,  magnification  315  diameters,  show  typical 
incipient  fissures  as  found  in  specimen  B.  Figures  15a  and  15b  show 
analogous  fields  in  section  D. 


14b 


14C 


No.  14.  Typical  incipient  fissures  found  in  head  of  rail  No.  10,  section  marked  "B. 

315  diameters. 


Magnification, 


Figure  15c  shows  one  of  the  largest  of  the  sulphide-slag  areas  and 
illustrates  the  smallness  of  these  inclusions. 

Specimens  C  and  E  (see  fig.  11)  show  no  incipient  fissures  and  no 
abnormalities  of  structure. 

Plotting  the  fissured  areas  as  seen  in  figure  11,  it  will  be  noted 
that  they  are  practically  limited  to  the  gauge  side  at  or  near  the 


ACCIDENT  NEAR  WESTERLY,  R.  I.,  OK  OCTOBER  25,  1913. 


25 


center  of  the  head  and  are  in  the  regions  immediately  affected  by 
the  wheel  loads. 


15a 


15b  15c 

No.  15.  Typical  incipient  fissures  found  in  the  head  of  rail  No.  10,  section  marked  "D,"  represented  by 
15a  and  15b.  One  of  the  largest  sulphide-slag  areas  of  rail  No.  10,  illustrating  the  smallness  of  these  inclu- 
sions is  represented  by  15c.    Magnification,  315  diameter?. 

The  opinion  is  advanced  that  these  fissures  are  set  up  by  these 
loads,  and  in  support  of  this  the  statement  is  made  that  new  rails 
which  had  not  been  in  the  track  and  which  have  as  high  and  even 
higher  carbon  content  do  not  show  under  the  microscope  similar 
fissured  areas. 

CONCLUSIONS. 

The  Westerly  rail  No.  1  shows  nothing  in  its  structure  to  indicate 
any  abnormalities  in  the  mill  practice.  The  rail  is  comparatively  free 
from  slag,  sulphide,  and  oxide  areas.     None  of  the  areas  showing 


26  INTERSTATE    COMMERCE    COMMISSION. 

macroscopic  or  microscopic  fissures  can  be  correlated  with  areas  con- 
taining sulphide,  slag,  oxide,  or  segregations. 

Rail  No.  10  shows  nothing  in  its  structure  to  indicate  any  abnor- 
malities in  the  mill  practice.  Slag,  sulphide,  and  oxide  areas  are 
very  sparingly  distributed  and  are  relatively  small.  Numerous  in- 
cipient fissures  are  present  and  are  located  in  the  head  on  the  gauge 
side. 

The  general  structure  of  the  two  rails  is  such  as  to  warrant  the 
statement  that  they  are  of  a  carbon  content  that  will  not  afford  a 
toughness  and  ductility  comparable  with  that  of  a  properly  treated 
rail  of  a  lower  carbon  content,  hence  the  transverse  fissures. 

To  remedy  this  condition  two  courses  are  open — fix  the  upper 
carbon  limit  and  prescribe  the  mill  treatment  which  will  insure  the 
maximum  toughness  and  ductility  with  a  sufficient  strength,  or  reduce 
the  wheel  loads.    The  former  plan  is  to  be  preferred. 


The  metallographic  examination  by  Mr.  Tassin  completed  the 
present  examination  of  the  material  pertaining  to  this  derailment. 

Concerning  the  prevalence  of  transverse  fissures  in  steel  rails,  of  a 
macroscopic  order,  not  referring  at  this  time  to  those  microscopic,  of 
such  dimensions  as  are  menacing  to  the  safety  of  railway  travel,  they 
are  believed  to  be  numerous.  Forty-six  transverse  fissures  of  recent 
occurrence  have  been  reported  in  32  rails.  Instances  have  been  re- 
ported in  which  five  transverse  fissures  have  been  found  in  the  same 
rail  within  the  limits  of  3  feet.  They  are  present  in  both  open-hearth 
and  Bessemer  steels.  They  are  not  confined  to  the  product  of  the  rail 
mills  of  one  section  of  the  country.  They  occur  over  ties  and  between 
ties,  near  the  ends  of  the  rails  and  along  the  middle  of  their  lengths, 
on  tangents  and  in  the  upper  as  well  as  the  lower  rails  on  curves. 
But  one  general  remark  can  be  made — they  persistently  appear  on  the 
gauge  side  of  the  head. 

In  their  maximum  state  of  development  they  have  been  witnessed 
in  100-pound  rails  having  attained  a  superficial  area  of  3.3  square 
inches,  leaving  practically  only  the  web  and  the  base  intact.  Our 
investigation  shows  without  question  that  these  hidden  fissures  in 
some  rails  reach  such  a  state  of  development  before  discovery  as  to 
destroy  nearly  the  entire  head  of  the  rail,  therefore  it  is  not  reassur- 
ing that  other  rails  of  similar  composition,  working  under  similar 
conditions  of  service,  are  not  free  from  these  interior  defects.  The 
continuance  of  conditions  which  have  resulted  in  derailments,  at- 
tended with  loss  of  life  and  injury  to  passengers  and  employees, 
places  a  great  responsibility  upon  all  who  can  in  any  manner  aid 
in  the  inauguration  of  measures  which  will  tend  immediately  to 
ameliorate  these  irrave  conditions. 


ACCIDENT   NEAK  WESTERLY,   R.   I.,   ON   OCTOBER  25,   1913.  27 

Reference  has  been  made  in  earlier  derailment  reports  to  causes 
which  are  believed  to  be  contributory  to  the  formation  and  develop- 
ment of  transverse  fissures.  Data  have  since  been  gathered,  some  of 
which  are  embodied  herein,  illustrating  the  probable  sequence  of 
events  which  attend  their  formation,  from  the  results  of  which  the 
contributory  causes  more  clearly  admit  of  recognition.  Tracing  the 
fissures  in  the  reverse  order  of  their  development,  they  are  followed 
down  from  the  larger  ones  of  rails  broken  in  the  track  having  dark- 
ened oxidized  surfaces  to  those  of  an  earlier  stage  of  development,  of 
smaller  diameter  with  bright  silvery  surfaces,  which  have  not  yet 
extended  to  the  outer  surface  of  the  rail  and  therefore  retain  the 
brightness  of  freshly  fractured  surfaces. 

Next  earlier  appear  fine  cracks,  not  easily  discernible  to  the  eye 
until  the  steel  has  been  etched,  preceded  by  other  cracks  still  finer  of 
a  microscopic  order,  but  of  measurable  length  to  the  eye  if  the 
cracks  were  of  sufficient  width  to  be  seen,  eventually  leading  to  the 
detection  of  microfissures  and  the  fragmentary  or  partial  separation 
of  the  microconstjtuents.  These  indications  folloAv  each  other  in 
such  order  that  they  appear  to  belong  together,  representing  different 
stages  in  the  loss  of  structural  integrity  and  destruction  of  the  metal 
of  the  rail. 

Such  are  the  indications  which  pertain  to  rails  which  have  been 
in  service.  They  have  been  looked  for,  but  not  found,  in  steel  which 
has  not  been  in  service,  of  similar  composition  and  concurrent  manu- 
facture. As  the  evidence  stands  the  formation  of  such  fissures  seems 
attributable  to  track  conditions  and  to  those  stresses  which  reach  a 
maximum  in  the  metal  of  the  rail  at  the  head. 

Steel  of  the  composition  of  these  rails  in  inherently  a  strong  steel. 
Music  wire  is  drawn  from  steel  of  0.85  carbon  and  in  the  form  of 
fine  wire  displays  great  strength.  Records  of  such  wire  show  a 
tensile  strength  exceeding  450,000  pounds  per  square  inch.  This 
grade  of  steel,  in  the  form  of  hot-rolled,  cylindrical  bars,  also,  will 
endure  repeated  stresses  applied  many  million  times,  as  high  as 
40,000  pounds  per  square  inch.  Furthermore,  in  these  rails  the  steel 
has  displayed,  in  specimens  from  unaffected  parts  of  the  cross  section, 
tensile  strength  in  round  numbers  ranging  from  140,000  to  150,000 
pounds  per  square  inch.  The  strength  possessed  by  steel  of  this 
carbon  content  shows  that  in  dealing  with  rails  of  such  composition 
we  have  a  metal  which  in  its  original  state  has  high  physical 
properties. 

The  spontaneous  rupture  of  steels  from  internal  causes  occasion- 
ally occurs  with  metal  hardened  by  heating  and  quenching.  Intense 
internal  strains  are  set  up  by  sudden  quenching  which,  if  not  amelio- 
rated by  drawing  the  temper,  may  occasion  spontaneous  rupture. 
Coils  of  hard-drawn  wire  have  shown  fractured  ends  developed  a  few 


28  INTERSTATE    COMMERCE    COMMISSION. 

hours  after  drawing.  Castings  also  have  failed  spontaneously. 
These  examples,  however,  refer  to  other  classes  of  material  than  rails, 
while  internal  tendencies,  if  any  of  special  account  exist  in  steel 
rails  due  to  casting  or  rolling  conditions,  have  not  so  far  as  known 
materially  contributed  toward  rupture,  Internal  strains  are  left  in 
steel  rails  as  in  all  hot  rolled  and  naturally  cooled  steel,  modified 
by  shape,  weight  of  section,  and  rate  of  cooling,  and  higher  strains 
may  exist  in  hard  steels  over  those  of  lower  grades  in  composition. 
These  features  are  all  known  to  exist,  and  while  in  a  strict  sense  they 
are  not  negligible  factors  in  the  use  of  steels,  nevertheless  so  far  as 
pertains  to  the  formation  of  transverse  fissures  in  steel  rails  they 
are  not  held  to  be  vital. 

In  reference  to  the  relative  strength  of  steel  at  the  interior  and 
exterior  of  the  shapes  in  the  different  passes  of  the  bloom  and 
rail  mills :  The  metal  at  the  interior  has  been  found  lower  in  tensile 
strength  than  that  near  the  surface,  in  the  early  passes.  However, 
when  the  finished  rail  is  reached  these  differences  are  inconspicuous, 
but  with  the  thinner  sections  of  the  web  and  base  commonly  showing 
higher  strength  than  the  heavier  section  of  the  head.  In  this  inquiry 
the  strength  of  metal  at  the  center  of  the  head  of  an  unused  rail,  one 
taken  from  a  spare  rail  post,  was  found  to  be  148,000  pounds  per 
square  inch.  This  indicated  normal  strength,  showing  no  inherent 
weakness  in  the  metal  of  that  portion  of  the  head  in  which  the  weak- 
ened steel  of  rails,  taken  from  the  track,  has  been  found. 

Gagging  is  an  operation  common  in  all  rail  mills.  Necessarily 
the  elastic  limit  of  the  metal  must  be  exceeded  in  this  operation, 
otherwise  no  permanent  straightening  would  result,  and  since  the 
elastic  limit  must  be  exceeded,  it  follows  that  the  higher  the  elastic 
limit  of  the  steel  the  greater  will  be  the  overstraining  force  required 
to  effect  the  straightening. 

The  actual  bending  force  required  for  the  purpose  obviously  may 
be  modified  by  regulating  the  distance  between  the  supports  of  the 
gagging  press,  but  the  resultant  longitudinal  strain  in  the  rail  must 
in  any  event  be  sufficient  to  balance  the  internal  strains  which  tend 
to  cause  the  rail  to  return  to  its  original  bent  shape.  These  internal 
strains  will  be  greater  in  steels  of  high  physical  properties  than  in 
mild  grades  of  metal.  In  prescribing  hard  steel  for  rails  these 
severe  internal  conditions  will  necessarily  be  encountered. 

Significance  would  attach  to  these  several  features  in  searching 
for  causes  leading  to  the  development  of  transverse  fissures  if  inti- 
mate relations  were  found  to  exist  between  them  and  such  defects. 
While  not  entirely  disassociated,  their  influence  and  mutual  rela- 
tions seem  remotely  connected.  Evidence  connecting  the  formation 
of  transverse  fissures  with  these  primitive  conditions  is  less  direct 
than  that  which  attaches  to  track  conditions. 


ACCIDENT   NEAR  WESTERLY,  R.  I.,   ON  OCTOBER  25,  1913.  29 

In  reviewing  the  results  of  this  inquiry  it  will  be  noted  that  the 
tensile  strength  of  a  rail  of  substantially  the  grade  of  metal  repre- 
sented in  rail  No.  1  was  148,000  pounds  per  square  inch.  This 
strength  was  found  at  the  center  of  the  head  of  a  rail  which  had  not 
been  in  service,  but  one  which  was  rolled  in  the  same  year  and  month 
and  by  the  same  manufacturer  as  rail  No.  1.  Microscopically,  no 
fissures  were  found  in  this  unused  rail. 

Eail  No.  1  and  its  companion  No.  2  showed  substantially  the  same 
strength  in  each  of  their  webs  and  bases,  closely  approached  by  the 
metal  in  some  parts  of  their  heads.  .  Metal  from  the  head  of  No.  1, 
forged  down  and  heat  treated,  gave  correspondingly  high  results.  The 
normal  strength  of  the  steel,  as  indicated  in  these  tests,  ranged  from 
140,000  to  150,000  pounds  per  square  inch.  In  general,  however,  the 
metal  in  the.  heads  of  both  rails,  taken  in  the  condition  the  rail  came 
from  the  track,  showed  impaired  strength.  A  tensile  specimen  from 
the  head  of  rail  No.  1  fractured  at  60,000  pounds  per  square  inch, 
while  a  corresponding  specimen  from  No.  2  failed  at  49,800  pounds 
per  square  inch.  An  annealed  specimen  from  No.  2  had  a  tensile 
strength  of  66,300  pounds  per  square  inch.  The  latter  ruptured  at 
a  preexisting  defect,  an  interior  fissure  of  small  size,  which  was 
shown  by  an  oxidize'd  spot  at  the  circumference  of  the  test  piece. 
Tests  conducted  by  the  New  Haven  Railroad  on  these  features  of  the 
case  furnished  corroborative  results.  The  metal  in  the  head  of  each 
rail  was  in  a  weakened  condition. 

The  metallographic  examination  of  No.  1  showed  the  presence  of 
incipient  fissures  and  a  condition  of  structural  unsoundness  existing 
in  different  parts  of  the  length  of  the  rail.  This  unsoundness  affected 
the  metal  in  the  center  of  the  head  and  on  the  gauge  side.  A  gener- 
ally shattered  state  characterized  the  metal  of  certain  parts  of  the 
head,  while  in  other  parts  of  the  cross  section  of  the  rail  the  steel  was 
intact. 

Although  rail  No.  1  had  developed  transverse  fissures  and  had 
broken  in  the  track,  while  No.  2  had  not  experienced  such  extreme 
vicissitudes,  nevertheless  the  weakened  condition  of  the  metal  in  the 
head  of  each  was  about  the  same.  Had  rail  No.  2  been  kept  in  the 
track  it  is  believed  that  it  would  eventually  have  developed  the  same 
kind  of  fissures  as  shown  by  No.  1.  The  zones  in  which  this  state  of 
weakness  was  found  where  located  in  the  same  places  in  each  rail  and 
closely  coincided  with  the  zone  of  disturbed  metal  which  had  been  ex- 
perimentally made  in  reciprocating  tests  of  rails  under  high  wheel 
pressures. 

Another  rail  of  this  series  was  microscopically  examined,  one  taken 
from  the  track  after  the  same  period  of  service  as  rail  No.  1,  from 
which  it  differed  in  having  lower  phosphorus  and  manganese.     Its 


30  INTERSTATE    COMMERCE    COMMISSION. 

phosphorus  content  was  0.020;  manganese,  0.49.  This  rail  showed 
similar  incipient  fissures  to  those  of  No.  1. 

Loss  in  tensile  strength,  the  display  of  macroscopic  and  microscopic 
fissures,  and  the  development  of  transverse  fissures,  all  seem  to  be 
associated  phenomena,  and  from  the  location  of  the  affected  metal 
seem  traceable  to  the  action  of  wheel  loads  for  their  development. 
No  other  cause  is  recognized  as  being  present  to  which  their  formation 
could  be  ascribed. 

The  general  condition  of  the  steel  in  these  tests  outside  of  the 
affected  zone  was  good  and  possessed  of  normal  strength.  The  me- 
tal lographic  structure  was  the  same  at  the  fissures  as  in  other  por- 
tions of  the  rail.  There  were  no  slag  inclusions  or  indications  of  the 
presence  of  slag  at  the  transverse  fissures  where  the  rail  fractured, 
nor  was  slag  found  at  the  microfissures,  of  which  there  were  many 
examples  in  the  different  rails.  Slag  inclusions  did  not,  so  far  as  can 
be  ascertained,  locate  either  the  places  of  incipient  fissures  or  the 
larger  transverse  fissures  of  the  broken  rail.  Since  such  inclusions 
would  be  acicular  in  shape,  in  size  not  materially  detracting  from  the 
sectional  area  of  the  steel,  and  drawn  out  parallel  to  the  length  of  the 
rail,  they  would  not  be  expected  to  exert  any  appreciable  influence  on 
the  strength  of  the  rail  against  longitudinal  stresses.  A  number  of 
slag  streaks  were  specially  examined  for  the  purpose  of  ascertaining 
whether  incipient  fissures  had  their  origin  at  such  streaks,  but  no 
fissures  were  found  associated  with  them.  Metallographically  nor- 
mal mill  practice  is  indicated. 

In  conclusion  it  appears — 

That  the  derailment  of  train  No.  26  was  due  to  a  broken  rail. 

That  the  rail  fractured  under  this  train  by  reason  of  the  presence 
of  transverse  fissures  in  its  head,  one  of  which  was  located  6  feet  7 
inches  from  the  leaving  end  and  is  believed  to  have  been  the  place  of 
initial  fracture. 

That  five  transverse  fissures  were  found  in  the  rail  ranging  in  diam- 
eter from  five-eighths  inch  to  If  inches. 

That  fissures  of  lesser  extent  were  present  in  both  this  rail  and  a 
companion  rail  of  the  same  heat,  each  of  which  had  had  the  same  term 
of  service  in  the  track. 

That  the  metal  in  the  heads  of  these  rails  was  in  a  weakened  state 
in  certain  affected  zones,  the  affected  zones  being  located  near  the 
center  of  the  head  and  toward  the  gauge  side. 

That  the  weakened  and  structurally  impaired  metal  shown  in  the 
tensile  tests  was  confirmed  by  tht  metallographic  examination. 

That  the  steel  in  other  parts  of  the  rail  was  structurally  sound  and 
possessed  of  normal  strength. 

That  no  slag  inclusions  were  associated  with  the  transverse  fissures 
nor  with  the  microfissures. 


ACCIDENT  NEAR  WESTERLY,  R.  I.,   ON  OCTOBER  25,   1913. 


31 


That  fissures  were  present  in  different  stages  of  development, 
associated  with  each  other  apparently  as  to  a  common  cause,  the 
microscopic  examination  indicating  that  such  fissures  were  located 
in  metal  otherwise  structurally  sound. 

That  microscopic  fissures  were  present  in  certain  other  used  rails, 
which  had  not  yet  developed  full-sized  transverse  fissures,  furnishing 
evidence  that  such  rails  were  approaching  a  state  in  which  full-sized 
fissures  would  eventually  be  formed. 

That  the  proximate  causes  to  which  the  transverse  fissures  in 
broken  rail  No.  1  are  ascribed  are  high  wheel  loads  with  their  attend- 
ing strains,  evidence  of  other  causes  not  having  been  found. 

That  testimony  is  to  the  effect  that  a  considerable  number  of  rail 
failures  have  recently  occurred  by  reason  of  the  presence  of  transverse 
fissures. 

That  conditions  which  were  precursors  to  the  formation  of  trans- 
verse fissures  in  broken  rail  No.  1  exist  in  other  rails  now  in  service. 

That  the  presence  in  the  track  and  continued  use  of  rails  of  the 
same  or  similar  composition  to  rail  No.  1  and  exposed  to  the  same 
service  conditions  is  a  source  of  danger. 

That  evidence  acquired  indicates  that  transverse  fissures  may  be 
and  are  formed  through  the  action  of  high  wheel  loads  upon  hard 
steel  rails. 


It  is  manifestly  evident  from  the  above  report  and  conclusions  of 
Mr.  Howard,  which  are  concurred  in,  that  in  this  type  of  rail  failures 
there  is  presented  a  serious  situation.  Rail  failures  of  other  types 
have  been  the  cause  of  many  accidents. 

The  figures  contained  in  the  following  table  are  taken  from  the 
monthly  accident  reports  made  to  the  Commission  by  the  railroads 
and  showr  the  number  of  derailments  caused  by  broken  rails  which 
have  occurred  yearly  since  July  1,  1901,  together  with  the  casualties 
and  monetary  loss  resulting  therefrom : 


Year. 

Number 
of  acci- 
dents. 

Killed. 

Injured. 

Damage, 

including 

cost  of 

clearing 

wreckage. 

1902 

1903 

1904 

1905 

1906 

1907 

1908 

1909 

78 
150 
176 
201 
220 
308 
238 
196 

5 
12 
9 

4 

12 
16 
5 
24 
12 
52 
17 

207 
204 
139 
465 
635 
699 
433 
498 
369 
463 
1,065 
827 

$128, 769 
166,140 
157,682 
257,519 
254,862 
284,675 
296,327 
191,842 
293,899 
292, 749 
511,778 
401,551 

1910 

243 
249 
363 
340 

1911 

1912 

1913 

Total.. 

2,762 

175 

6,004 

3,237,793 

UNIVERSITY  OF  FLORIDA 


32  INTERSTATE    COMMERCE   COIV  3  1262  08856  1989 

This  enumeration  of  casualties  refers  to  a  period  the  greater  part 
of  which  elapsed  before  rail  failures  by  transverse  fissures  were 
known  or  had  become  so  prevalent  as  they  now  appear.  The  tabu- 
lated results,  however,  emphasize  the  importance  which  the  subject 
of  safety  in  rails  has  assumed.  To  those  elements  of  danger  existing 
in  the  past  is  now  added  this  type  of  failure  shown  in  the  develop- 
ment of  interior  fissures.  On  account  of  the  insidious  character  of 
these  fissures  and  the  fact  that  they  are  progressive  in  their  devel- 
opment, and  so  far  as  is  known  no  system  of  inspection  has  been 
found  that  will  detect  them  until  they  have  reached  the  surface  of  the 
rail,  make  it  extremely  difficult  to  suggest  any  preventive  against 
future  accidents  of  this  character. 

Although  as  noted  in  previous  reports  dealing  with  rails  failing  on 
account  of  transverse  fissures,  it  seems  apparent  that  a  remedy  lies  in 
the  diminishing  of  wheel  pressures  and  the  lowering  of  direct  com- 
pressive bending  and  shearing  stresses. 

From  the  constant  increase  in  rail  breakages  occurring  from  this 
new  type  of  failure,  it  would  appear  that  the  danger  zone  in  the 
use  of  steel  rails  as  at  present  manufactured  has  been  reached,  since 
the  study  of  the  rails  here  under  discussion  appears  to  indicate  that 
transverse  fissures  are  the  direct  result  of  high-wheel  pressures  act- 
ing upon  hard  steel.  A  complete  investigation  of  rail,  track,  and 
wheel  load  conditions  for  the  purpose  of  determining  the  effect 
thereon  of  the  recent  types  of  locomotives  and  cars,  with  their  greatly 
increased  wheel  loads,  should  be  undertaken  for  the  purpose  of  sci- 
entifically determining  this  matter  and  ascertaining  a  remedy. 

Eespectfully  submitted. 

H.  W.  Belnap, 
Chief  Inspector  of  Safety  Appliances. 

o 


WASHINGTON  :   OOVERXMENT  miNTINC  OFFIPE  :    191-1 


